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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between bank concentration and economic growth in 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries. This is done using the system GMM 
estimators on a panel data sample consisting of 41 countries and 650 observations. Our 
analysis reveals that bank concentration impacts negatively on economic growth, and this 
relationship is non-linear. Furthermore, the impact of bank concentration on economic 
growth is found to be dependent on the country’s income but not corruption levels. 
Nevertheless, different concentration measures provide somehow different results, and thus 
policymakers should be careful when making policy recommendations. However, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that bank concentration should be controlled as much as possible 
to promote economic growth in OIC countries. 
Keywords: Bank concentration, financial development, economic growth, OIC countries, 
corruption, income level. 




Even though the literature provides conflicting views, a functional banking sector is an 
important component in the stable financial system. It plays a key role in the economic 
development of a country and its economic growth. A well-functioning banking sector is 
especially important for developing countries. However, in the last two decades, the world 
witnessed the global trend of bank consolidation. This raises the issue of bank concentration 
and its impact on economic growth to the forefront of academic discussion. 
 
As of now, two major views emerged from the literature. The first view is in favour of a 
competitive banking structure as it generally leads to efficiency, cheaper credits, and widely 
available to all (Di Patti & Dell'Ariccia, 2004). On the contrary, the second view supports a 
robust or monopolistic banking structure. Under this view, bank concentration may stimulate 
economic growth as these banks are more capable of information collection, screening and 
monitoring borrowers (Abuzayed & Al-Fayoumi, 2016; Cetorelli & Gambera, 2001; De Guevara 
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However, despite overwhelming literature on finance–growth nexus in general and bank 
concentration–economic growth in particular, this issue has not been adequately addressed 
within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member countries. This motivated us to 
investigate this relationship within OIC member countries, which we view essential for several 
reasons. First, theoretical, and empirical results offered by the literature are far from being 
conclusive as the results yield contradictory conclusions. In other words, whether bank 
concentration contributes to overall economic growth or not is unclear as the current 
discussion on the topic is far from being complete. Second, the literature under review is 
primarily concerned with developed and developing countries. They focus more on U.S. and 
EU banks, thus largely ignoring OIC countries. Third, from an economic point of view, the 
majority of the OIC countries belong to the least developed and developing countries 
groups. At the same time, overall financial development is at very low levels, and there is an 
overwhelming corruption that may explain their overall underdevelopment. Fourth, it is 
argued that banks are the primary source of business finance in most of the countries 
(Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pescetto, 2004; Ito, 2006; Lee & Hsieh, 2013a, 2013b; Mlachila, Park, 
& Yabara, 2013; Moyo, Nandwa, Oduor, & Simpasa, 2014). The same is true for OIC countries 
that have banking sector more developed than stock markets. Finally, it is worth looking at 
this relationship to see if results will be similar or different as compared to other studies covering 
different sets of countries. Since the OIC countries are heterogeneous in nature and consist 
of developing and emerging economies, the impact of bank concentration on economic 
growth may be reflected in different ways. Consequently, discovering these ways is crucial 
for a better understanding of the topic and coming up with policy recommendations. 
 
Having said that, this paper seeks to remedy these issues through analysis of the existing 
literature and contribution to this growing area of research by exploring the impact of bank 
concentration on economic growth within OIC member countries. Using a panel data set 
consisting of developing and emerging economies of different financial structures and sizes, 
we will therefore test: 
 
i. Does bank concentration impact economic growth within the OIC member countries 
positively or negatively? 
ii. Furthermore, as there is a discrepancy between the sample countries and their socio-
economic and financial development, we will also study whether these relationships 
differ once we split the data set into two subcategories, namely: (i) emerging and 
developing economies; and (ii) corrupted and less–corrupted countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review; 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology used; Section 4; analyses empirical results; 
Section 5 is left for concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the finance–growth nexus. The global 
trend of bank consolidation brought up another critical dimension on the topic by exploring 
bank concentration and economic growth relationship. In this regard, there are two primary, 
but contradicting views. On one side, some support a competitive banking structure as it 
promotes competitive market practices that lead to efficiency. Greater competition in the 
banking industry, among other things, makes credit cheaper and more available to all 
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In contrast, a banking structure that is highly concentrated and with monopolistic power, in 
their view and according to economic theory, will be detrimental to economic growth. In 
general, a monopoly is associated with inefficient resource allocation where optimal levels 
and prices of products and services are not reached. Recent evidence suggests that banks 
with monopoly power tend to extract excessive rents from firms through higher loan rates, 
reduce credit availability in general, lead to financial barriers to entering markets, promote 
moral hazard problem and credit rationing by banks (Cetorelli & Strahan, 2006; Diallo & Koch, 
2017; Fisman & Raturi, 2004; Guzman, 2000; Hannan, 1991; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
A number of studies have found that a more competitive banking sector is conducive to firm 
creation, credit access (especially for new and small firms), and overall industrial and 
economic growth as a concentrated banking sector creates financial impediments for new 
firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2003; Black & Strahan, 2002; Carlin & Mayer, 2003; 
Cetorelli & Gambera, 2001; Cetorelli & Strahan, 2006; Claessens & Laeven, 2005). Similarly, 
Shaffer (1998) finds a positive association between household income growth and the 
number of banks in the market using U.S. cross-sectional data. 
One of the rare studies focusing on the causality between banking concentration and 
economic growth and covering some of the OIC countries in the sample is a study by 
Ghasemi & Abdolshah (2014). By covering 15 countries over the period 2004–2011, they found 
a bi-directional relationship whereby bank monopoly power harms economic growth, and 
economic growth promotes bank monopoly power. 
On the other side, Jackson and Thomas (1995), Petersen and Rajan (1995), and Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) find that local bank concentration helps small business firms in the U.S. to 
alleviate credit constraints more effectively. Similar findings are reported by Abuzayed and 
Al-Fayoumi (2016) for 15 Middle East and North African (MENA) countries and De Guevara 
and Maudos (2011)1.  
It has been argued that banks with monopolistic power (bank concentration) may spur 
economic growth as they are more capable of information collection, screening, and 
monitoring borrowers. These banks can sustain long-lasting relationships with their clients 
promoting financial stability since excessive competition between banks can result in a sort 
of financial instability (Di Patti & Dell'Ariccia, 2004). 
Thus, contrary to the common wisdom that banking competition unequivocally leads to 
overall welfare, Cetorelli (2001) finds that there might be specific channels through which it 
may have adverse economic effects. Other studies also support this view (see Dewatripont & 
Maskin, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Rajan & Zingales, 2001). In fact, based on the literature 
reviewed, Cetorelli (2001) further concludes that when it comes to the most desirable banking 
market structure neither extreme – monopoly or perfect competition – may be the best 
option. This is further substantiated by Deidda and Fattouh (2005) who claim that banking 
concentration exerts two opposite effects on growth: economies of specialization and 
duplication of banks’ investment in fixed capital. The former is beneficial, and the latter is 
detrimental to economic growth (Deidda & Fattouh, 2005). 
In short, it can be seen then that the current discussion on the topic is far from being complete. 
Furthermore, most studies on the topic have only focused on U.S. and EU markets in general 
and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The 
                                                     
1   De Guevara and Maudos (2011) find that bank market power increases economic growth only up to a certain point 
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existing literature fails to address the issue from less-developed countries’ points of view, and 
this analysis is necessary for a better understanding of the topic. Hence, this study provides an 
exciting opportunity to advance our knowledge of the bank concentration-economic 
growth relationship by looking at the issue using OIC countries as a sample. Not only that our 
study will investigate this relationship on the whole sample, but it will also divide the sample 
into two broad categories to get additional insights into this relationship. These two categories 
are: (i) developing– and emerging economies; and (ii) corrupted and less–corrupted 
countries within the OIC countries sample. 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Table 1: Selected OIC countries 
No. Country Name No. Country Name No. Country Name 
1 Afghanistan 15 Jordan 29 Pakistan 
2 Albania 16 Kazakhstan 30 Qatar 
3 Algeria 17 Kuwait 31 Saudi Arabia 
4 Azerbaijan 18 Kyrgyz 32 Senegal 
5 Bahrain 19 Lebanon 33 Sierra Leone 
6 Bangladesh 20 Libya 34 Sudan 
7 Benin 21 Malaysia 35 Togo 
8 Burkina-Faso 22 Mali 36 Tunisia 
9 Cameroon 23 Mauritania 37 Turkey 
10 Comoros 24 Morocco 38 Uganda 
11 Egypt 25 Mozambique 39 United Arab Emirates 
12 Gabon 26 Niger 40 Uzbekistan 
13 Gambia 27 Nigeria 41 Yemen 
14 Indonesia 28 Oman   
 
Initially, we wanted to include all 57 OIC member countries for the period between 2000 and 
2015. However, after collecting the data, we had to drop certain countries and years for 
which there was no sufficient data. The inclusion of a country into our sample is subject to 
specific criteria. First, we include only those countries that have data for our dependant and 
independent variables, namely real per capita GDP, and concentration measures. Those 
countries that are missing these data are excluded from our sample. Second, we include only 
those countries that have at least three years of continuous observations. 2Since we are using 
the GMM method, it is a minimum requirement for data to be processed. Hence, we removed 
single and two–year observations from our sample. Finally, to reduce the effect of possibly 
spurious outliers, we eliminate them in all variables by winsorizing at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles within each country (Beck et al., 2013). After applying these criteria, our final 
sample comes to a list of 41 countries and 650 observations. Table 1 presents the full sample 
of selected countries. 
Furthermore, several studies investigated whether the effect of bank 
concentration/competition on economic growth is different when applied to developed and 
developing countries. The OIC group of countries provides a mixture, consisting of a majority 
                                                     
2  Beck et al. (2013) included countries with at least 2 years of continuous observations. However, since we are using 
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of underdeveloped and developing countries with few countries belonging to the group of 
high–income countries. Thus, the sample offers a unique opportunity to investigate the 
hypothesis that bank concentration has a different effect on economic growth due to 
different economic development. As a result, we split our sample into two subcategories: 
developing– and emerging economies. Based on the World Bank classifications, countries are 
classified into four income categories, namely: low income, lower middle income, upper 
middle income, and high income. For this study, we combined low and lower-middle-income 
countries into developing economies. 
 
Similarly, we combined upper middle income and high-income countries into emerging 
economies. The detailed classifications, according to the World Bank methodology, is 
presented in Table 2. Out of 41 countries in our sample, 25 or 60.98% fall under the developing 
economies group, while the remaining 16 or 39.02% of countries fall under the emerging 
economies group. We go a step further and investigate our sample from a corruption point 
of view. As a proxy measure of a level of corruption, we use control of corruption (estimate) 
data provided by the World Governance Indicator, the World Bank. 
 
Table 2: Developing and Emerging Economies - OIC countries 
Developing Economies Emerging Economies 
Low Income Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income High Income 
Afghanistan Bangladesh Albania Bahrain 
Benin Cameroon Algeria Kuwait 
Burkina-Faso Comoros Azerbaijan Oman 
Gambia Egypt Gabon Qatar 
Mali Indonesia Jordan Saudi Arabia 
Mozambique Kyrgyz Kazakhstan United Arab Emirates 
Niger Mauritania Lebanon  
Sierra Leone Morocco Libya  
Togo Nigeria Malaysia  
Uganda Pakistan Turkey  
Yemen Senegal   
 Sudan   
 Tunisia   
 
Finally, the data will be obtained from BankFocus (earlier known as BankScope) database of 
Bureau van Dijk’s company, International Monetary Fund, UNESCO Institute for Statistics and 
several World Bank’s databases, namely the World Development Indicators, the Global 









BANK CONCENTRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH NEXUS 
Table 3: Summary of All Variables 
VARIABLES SIGN DEFINITION SOURCE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE(S) 
Economic Growth  Gpc The real per capita GDP. WDIa 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE(S) 
Measures of Market Structure Concentration 






A measure of the degree of competitiveness of the 
banking sector, proxied by the total assets of the five 





Concentration ratio 3-bank CR3 
A measure of the degree of competitiveness of the 
banking sector, proxied by the total assets of the three 









HHI is defined as the sum of the square of the market 
shares (based on total assets) of all the banks that 
compete in the market. 
WITSb   
 
  
Measures of Market Power Concentration 






A measure of market power in the banking market. It is 
defined as the difference between output prices and 




Boone indicator  BI  
A measure of the degree of competition, calculated as 





Gross capital formation GCF 
The net increase in physical assets (investment minus 
disposals) within the measurement period, and it can be 
measured as a ratio of GDP. 
WDI 




The sum of exports and imports of goods and services 






Measured by the ratio of the government’s final 
consumption expenditure to GDP. WDI 




A ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP.  
IFSc 
  
Financial development L FIN_l  A ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP.  IFS  
Inflation (GDP deflator) I  Inflation-adjusted by the GDP deflator.  IMFd  
Financial crisis  C  
A dummy variable to capture the effect of the global 









Corrupted countries COR A variable to capture the effect of corrupted countries. WGIe 
Bank-specific 
Bank non-interest income BNI  
Bank’s income generated by noninterest related activities 
as a percentage of total income. GFD  
Bank cost to income BCI It measures overhead costs relative to gross revenues. GFDf 
Bank net interest margin BNIM The difference between the interest charged by the bank and the interest paid out to lenders.   
WDI 
a The World Development Indicators (WDI). The World Bank. 
b  The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The World Bank. 
c  International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
d International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files using World Bank data on the GDP deflator. 
e  World Governance Indicators (WGI). The World Bank. 
f  The Global Financial Development (GFD). The World Bank. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Analysis: Overview 
First of all, it is essential to note here that due to a potentially non-linear relationship between 
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control variables (except crisis) into natural logarithm forms. Hence, we will use these variables 
in natural logarithm forms throughout the study (Naceur, Blotevogel, Fischer, & Shi, 2017). 
Table 3 provides a summary of all variables, while Table 4 presents the summary statistics of our 
sample (in level forms).  3The average GDP per capita (Gpc) is 7,697.77 US$ (constant 2010), 
4but there is wide cross–country variation in the sample with a low of 256.54 US$ to a high of 
around 72,670.96 US$. The lowest GDP per capita was recorded in 2000 by Mozambique, while 
the highest was recorded in 2011 by Qatar. 
Table 4: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variable    Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gpc 650 7,697.77 13,921.72 256.54 7,2670.96 
CR5 534 83.22 14.74 33.42 100.00 
CR3 639 70.87 18.03 23.32 100.00 
HHI 549 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.67 
LI 518 0.32 0.13 -0.39 0.64 
BI 609 -0.06 0.17 -2.54 0.34 
GCF 623 24.68 8.09 1.10 61.47 
TO 633 76.15 34.71 21.45 220.41 
GS 622 14.11 4.78 0.95 30.00 
FIN_p 613 28.52 24.31 1.32 119.58 
FIN_l 613 47.12 39.41 8.36 242.33 
BNI 610 38.61 13.76 3.22 82.75 
BCI 610 52.92 14.55 21.03 139.47 
BNIM 648 4.96 2.69 0.57 18.63 
I 649 7.08 9.85 -25.96 73.84 
COR 557 -0.60 0.57 -1.64 1.57 
Notes: Gpc is the real GDP per capita. CR5 is the 5-bank concentration ratio. CR3 is the 3-bank concentration ratio. 
HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. LI is the Lerner index. BI is the Boone indicator. GCF is the gross capital formation. 
TO is the trade openness. GS is the government size. FIN_p is the ratio of private credit to GDP FIN_l is the ratio of liquid 
liabilities to GDP. BNI is the bank noninterest income to total income ratio. BCI is the bank cost to income ratio. BNIM is 
the bank net interest margin. I is the inflation (GDP deflator). COR is the control for corruption (estimate). 
 
In addition, the average concentration ratio measured by CR5 is about 83% with a low of about 
33% and a high value of 1 (i.e. 100%). The lowest point was recorded by Nigeria in 2001, while 
the highest was recorded by several countries (19 countries, to be precise). When measured 
by CR3, the average concentration ratio for our sample is about 71% with a low of about 23% 
and high values of 1 (i.e. 100%). The lowest concentration was found in the case of Nigeria in 
2002. After that period, the concentration ratio in Nigeria was also on the rise, reaching the 
highest value of 71.09% in 2006. Similar to the CR5 case, the highest concentration point, and 
hence the highest concentration was recorded by 14 OIC member countries. Consequently, it 
can be concluded from the data before us that there is an overwhelming concentration of 
the banking sector in OIC countries. Similar findings are evidenced by the other measures of 
bank concentration/competition as well. 
  
                                                     
3  Please note that the data presented in this descriptive section are based on winsorized dataset to eliminate spurious 
outliers as explained briefly in the previous section. 
4  Here, for simplicity purposed we explain certain descriptive statistics using level forms for the data. Such is the case 
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The presence of the overwhelming bank concentration within the OIC member countries 
should not come as a surprise as overall underdevelopment is also evident from some 
indicators. One of them is the financial development variables used in this study. Measured as 
a ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP, the 
average financial development is around 28%, with a minimum and maximum being 1.32% 
and 119.58% respectively. When liquid liabilities measure financial development to GDP ratio, 
the average is around 47%, while a minimum and maximum are 8.32% and 242.33% 
respectively. Another indicator that shows the overall underdevelopment of our sample 
countries is the gross capital formation (GCF) variable. Its average is 24.68% of GDP, with a low 
value of 1.10 % for Sierra Leone recorded in 2000, and a high value of 61.47% for Mauritania 
recorded in 2005. Furthermore, Table 5 provides a correlation matrix among the study variables. 
 
3.3 Data Descriptions 
After reviewing the existing literature, it is evident that there are standard measures when it 
comes to measuring the economic growth of a country. Following Beck, Degryse, and Kneer 
(2014), as economic growth proxy, this study uses the real per capita GDP (Gpc). The data 
source of these variables is the World Development Indicators (WDI) Database. 
When it comes to bank concentration/competition measures, several of them have been used 
in the literature. Perhaps the simplest and probably the most frequently used measure of bank 
concentration is the k bank concentration ratio. CR3 and CR5 are the most commonly used, 
representing the cumulative market share of the k largest banks in a country to the assets of 
the whole banking industry (Davis, 2007). Another measure is HHI index that takes into 
consideration the size distribution of all banks in the market making it better than the k bank 
concentration ratio (Carbó, Humphrey, Maudos, & Molyneux, 2009). 
One of the most popular non–structural measures of market power is the Lerner index (LI), 
developed by Abraham P. Lerner (1934). In essence, the Lerner index, or degree of monopoly 
power, measures a bank’s/firm’s market power by calculating the difference between output 
prices and marginal costs (relative to prices), following the methodology described in 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2010).5 
The usage of the Lerner index has several advantages over other measures of concentration 
/competition, especially those structural ones discussed earlier. Not only that the Lerner index 
can measure the market power of individual firms or specific products, but it can also measure 
the market power of the whole industry or market. As a result, it is considered as the only 
available measure of competition at the bank level (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Coccorese, 2009; Repkova, 2012). 
other non–structural measure of competition is the Boone indicator (BI). While challenging the 
theoretical foundations of the Lerner’s index, Boone (2004, 2008) proposed a macro–level index 
of competition that caters for some shortcomings of the Lerner index. i 6 
                                                     
5  Mathematically it is expressed as follows: Lerner Index = (P-MC)/P. Marginal cost is calculated using estimated 
translog cost function with respect to output and prices are calculated as total bank revenue over assets. For details 
see Demirgüç-Kunt and Martínez Pería (2010). 
 
6  Boone (2004, 2008) argued that the theoretical foundations of the existing price cost margin (PCM) measure of 
competition are not robust and proposed a macro–level index of competition. According to the Lerner index that is 
based on PCM, as competition increases in a given market/industry its PCM will decrease and finally reach zero in 







BANK CONCENTRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH NEXUS 
Several country-specific control variables are used as well. For example, gross capital formation 
(GCF) is a control variable that reflects the overall economic development of a country. Levine 
& Renelt (1992) and Islam (1995) find a significantly positive effect of gross domestic investment 
(now known as capital formation) as a share of GDP on growth. Trade openness (TO), 
measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP, is found 
to contribute positively to economic growth in a number of the existing empirical literature 
(Beck et al., 2014; Beck & Levine, 2004; Dollar, 1992; Dollar & Kraay, 2004). 
The government size (GS) is the most frequently used variable as it measures overall economic 
development and government policies. In this study, we use the ratio of the government’s final 
consumption expenditure to GDP. The financial crisis dummy (C) is used as an indicator of 
macroeconomic development. It takes the value of one for the year 2008 and 2009 and zeroes 
otherwise to capture the effect of the global financial crisis on economic growth. During a 
financial crisis, banks are faced with a few challenges that make them fragile. This brings about 
uncertainty in the market and increases overall risk. 
As a financial development indicator, we use two measures:  
i. a ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
(FIN_p) and it captures the allocation of credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions relative to the size of the economy; 
ii. a ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (FIN_l) that measures banks’ ability to mobilize funds or 
banking sector’s size  (see Abuzayed & Al-Fayoumi, 2016; Compton & Giedeman, 2011; 
Law & Singh, 2014). Both these ratios can be considered as part of overall institutional 
as well as banking development. 
It is worth mentioning here that we opt for these two measures of financial development for 
mainly two reasons, namely:  
i. financial development plays a crucial role in our study, and one of the objectives is the 
interaction between this variable and bank concentration measures;  
ii. this approach can also be considered as a part of robustness check for the overall 
results. 
As for ban-specific control variables, we use bank noninterest income (BNI), bank cost to 
income ratio (BCI), and bank net interest margin (BNIM). The BNI measures bank efficiency, 
overhead costs relative to gross revenues, with higher ratios indicating lower levels of cost-
efficiency. The BCI measures overhead costs relative to gross revenues with higher ratios 
indicating lower levels of cost-efficiency. It is argued that bank efficiency and its stability 
promote economic growth through its impact on bank efficiency and stability (Beck et al., 
2013). Finally, the BNIM is a measure of the difference between the interest paid and the interest 
received by banks. It is used as an indicator of the macroeconomic development of a country 
as it reflects the banks’ efficiency.7 
                                                     
competition may lead to higher PCM instead of lower margins. In this scenario, as further elaborated by Van 
Leuvensteijn et. al. (2011), “more efficient banks may have a higher PCM (skimming off part of the profits stemming 
from their efficiency lead), the increase of their market share may raise the industry’s average PCM, contrary to 
common expectations” (p. 3158). 
7 Boone (2004, 2008) argued that the theoretical foundations of the existing price cost margin (PCM) measure of 
competition are not robust and proposed a macro–level index of competition. According to the Lerner index that is 
based on PCM, as competition increases in a given market/industry its PCM will decrease and finally reach zero in 
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We use inflation as a control variable for overall macroeconomic conditions is inflation and a 
proxy for monetary (in)stability. Countries with high inflation tend to have financial systems that 
are generally underdeveloped and prone to financial crises (Boyd, Levine, & Smith, 2001; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). 
Table 6: Expected impact of variables 
Variables Sign Expected Impact 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE(S)   
 GDP per capita growth rate  Gpc  













Measures of Market Structure Concentration 
Concentration ratio – 5 top banks CR5 +|-   
Concentration ratio - 3 top banks CR3 +|-   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index HHI +|-   
Measures of Market Power Concentration 
Lerner index LI +|-   
Boone indicator BI +|-   








Bank noninterest income (%) BNI +|-   
Bank cost to income ratio (%) BCI - 
Bank net interest margin (%) BNIM +   










Inflation (GDP deflator) I -   
Financial crisis '08 & '09 (Dummy) C -   
Trade openness  TO + 
General economic development 
Human capital accumulation  HC + 
Gross capital formation GCF + 
Government size GS +|-   
Financial development 
Private credit by banks to GDP (%)  FIN_p +|-   
Liquid liabilities to GDP (%)  FIN_l +|-   
Policy variables 
Institutional development ID + 
Subgrouping 
Developing economies (dummy) DEV +|-   
Corrupted countries (dummy) COR -   
 
On top of that, we divided our sample into two sub-groups and introduced a dummy variable 
for each sub-group. The overall level of socio-economic development of a country may result 
in different effects of bank concentration on economic growth. Bank concentration has a 
significantly negative impact on economic growth low–income countries only (Abuzayed & Al-
Fayoumi, 2016; Deidda & Fattouh, 2005; A. I. Fernández, González, & Suárez, 2010). 
Consequently, we introduced a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for developing 
economies and 0 for emerging economies. Similarly, we introduced a corruption dummy 
(COR) variable to see how corruption level affects economic growth. A few studies indicate 
that corruption may have a positive effect on developing processes in the case of countries 
with excessive bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles (Bardhan, 1997; Leff, 1964). 
Overwhelming opinion, however, is that corruption has adverse effects not just on economic 
                                                     
competition may lead to higher PCM instead of lower margins. In this scenario, as further elaborated by Van 
Leuvensteijn et. al. (2011), “more efficient banks may have a higher PCM (skimming off part of the profits stemming 
from their efficiency lead), the increase of their market share may raise the industry’s average PCM, contrary to 
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growth but also on political and institutional developments of a country (Bardhan, 1997; 
Robinson, 1998; Voskanyan, 2000). 
Finally, Table 6 shows the expected impact of independent and control variables on 
economic growth. 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Baseline Empirical Methods 
To assess the impact of the bank concentration on economic growth within the OIC member 
countries we will use a variant of the models used by Berger et al. (2009), Alin & Bogdan (2011), 
Fu et al. (2014), Fernández & Garza–García (2015) and Abojeib (2017). For example, Abojeib 
(2017) used this model to investigate the relationship between competition and stability. 
Hence, our baseline model is as follows: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + τ𝑡𝑡 + ν𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡                        (1) 
where,  
Gpci,t     is the real per capita GDP of country i at time t, and where i denotes the 
cross-sectional dimension (i.e. country), and t denotes the time dimension 
(i.e. year). 
Gpci,t–1     the lagged dependent variable is included to account for persistency in 
real per capita GDP. 
CONi,t represents the concentration measure of country i at time t as measured 
by one of the concentration measures. 
Bi,t             is a vector of bank-specific control variables 
Ci,t  is a vector of country-specific control variables 
τt is a year dummy to control for time-varying standard shocks 
νi is a dummy to control for time-invariant country-specific factors, and 
εi,t is a residual value. 
The sign and magnitude of β in the estimations’ results using the model in Eq. 1 would indicate 
the nature of the relationship between bank concentration and economic growth. This is 
because the marginal effect of bank concentration on economic growth is equal to the partial 
derivative of Gpc with respect to CON or mathematically: 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
=  𝛽𝛽                                   (2) 
The above model assumes that the relationship between concentration and economic growth 
is linear. However, several studies show that this relationship may be non–linear, after all. For 
instance, see Cetorelli & Gambera (2001), di Patti & Dell'Ariccia (2004), Berger et al. (2009), 
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empirically, we will use the following models for bank concentration–economic growth non-
linear relationship: 
Gpci,t = αGpci,t−1 + β1CONi,t + β2CONi,t2 + δBi,t + θCi,t + νi + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡                     (3) 
In this case, we want to see whether the effect of bank concentration is only demonstrated up 
to a certain limit after which its effect might change. In this case, the marginal effect of bank 
concentration on economic growth would be as follows: 
∂Gpc
∂CON
=  β1 + 2 ∗ β2CON                       (4) 
The above equation represents a line with an intercept (β1) and a slope (2*β2) indicating that 
for each value of CON, the value of marginal effect would be different. The marginal effect 
would be zero when 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =  −𝛽𝛽1
2𝛽𝛽2
, which is called the inflection point or threshold level. However, 
depending on results from Eq. 4 above, the marginal effect would be positive or negative for 
any value of concentration higher or lower than the inflection point value. 
Finally, as there is a discrepancy between the sample countries and their socio-economic 
and financial development, we will also study whether these relationships differ once we split 
the dataset into two subcategories, namely: (i) emerging and developing economies; and (ii) 
corrupted and less–corrupted countries. 
To test this claim, we introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for developing 
economies/corrupted countries and 0 for emerging economies/less corrupted ones. Hence, 
we modify Eq. 1 by introducing interaction terms between the CON and developing 
economies (DEVj)/corrupted countries (CORj). Introducing the interaction term between CON 
and DEV/COR dummy would account for a potential difference in the concentration–growth 
relationship between developing and emerging economies on one side and corrupted and 
less corrupted OIC countries on the other. A similar approach has been taken by Deidda & 
Fattouh (2005), Fernández et al. (2010), and Abuzayed & Al–Fayoumi (2016). We get the 
following models: 
Gpci,t = αGpci,t−1 + β1CONi,t + β2DEVj + β3(CONi,t × DEVj) + δBi,t + θCi,t + νi + εi.t       (5) 
where j refers to emerging and developing economies, 0 for emerging and 1 for developing 
economy.  
Gpci,t = αGpci,t−1 + β1CONi,t + β2CORj + β3(CONi,t × CORj) + δBi,t + θCi,t + νi + εi.t  (6) 
where j refers to corrupted and less–corrupted country. 
Thus, in both cases, when the dummy variable (DEV or COR) is equal to 0, the marginal effect 
of bank concentration on economic growth would be:   
∂Gpc
∂CON
=  𝛽𝛽1                                       (7) 
In other words, the sign of 𝛽𝛽1 indicates the sign of the bank concentration-economic growth 
relationship for emerging/less corrupted economies. On the other hand, when the dummy 
variable (DEV or COR) is equal to 1, the marginal effect equation would be: 
∂Gpc
∂CON







BANK CONCENTRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH NEXUS 
In short, the significance or insignificance of 𝛽𝛽1+𝛽𝛽3 will determine whether there is a relationship 
between bank concentration and economic growth for developing economies/corrupted 
countries. Finally, by comparing 𝛽𝛽1 with 𝛽𝛽1+𝛽𝛽3 that are representing the marginal effect for 
emerging/corrupted and developing/less corrupted economies respectively, we can find out 
the difference between both types of income-and corruption-level countries in terms of a 
concentration-growth relationship. 
3.4.2 Estimation Method 
To date, various methods have been developed and introduced to measure bank 
concentration-growth relationships. Having in mind the fact that we are dealing with a 
dynamic panel dataset with a large number of cross-sections (N) and a small number of time 
periods (T), and following the existing literature on the topic, we will employ the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimators in our analysis. 
The initial GMM method was formalized by Hansen (1982), subsequently developed by Holtz–
Eakin, Newey, & Rosen (1988), Arellano & Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and Bond, Hoeffler, & Temple (2001) and became known in the literature as 
difference GMM and system GMM estimators. 
Both GMM estimators address the bias problems encountered by the OLS method and were 
developed for dynamic panel data models with many cross-section units (N) and a small 
number of time periods (T). They allow for the endogeneity of regressors (meaning that one or 
more of the regressors can be correlated with the error term), fixed effects, heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation within individuals. They can take care of unobserved country-specific 
effects (Roodman, 2009a). 
Both estimators fit our model using linear GMM. The difference GMM, also known as Arellano–
Bond estimator, was operationalized by Arellano & Bond (1991) whereby the estimation is 
proceeded by transforming all regressors, usually by differencing, in order to eliminate the fixed 
effect (Roodman, 2009b). However, this estimator may lead to poor results and large sample 
bias. Hence, to address this issue, Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) 
developed the system GMM which combines in a system the regression in differences with the 
regression in levels, i.e. it combines two equations (the original and the transformed one) in a 
system. In other words, “where lagged variables in levels instrument the differenced equation, 
lagged differences now instrument levels” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 138). This can improve 
efficiency and allows the introduction of more instruments (Roodman, 2009a). 8 Consequently, 
the system GMM method is much more consistent, asymptotically normally distributed, and 
efficient in estimating the coefficients of the model and in solving the problems of endogeneity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Hsiao, 2007). 
The consistency of the GMM estimator relies on two hypotheses. First, the assumption on validity 
(exogenous) of the instruments used. Second, the assumption that the differenced error terms 
do not exhibit second– or higher-order serial correlation. In order to ensure the GMM estimation 
validity and test the above hypotheses, we will run two specification tests suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The first hypothesis, i.e. the validity of instruments, is tested using Sargan and Hansen test of 
over-identifying restrictions. It tests the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample 
analogy of the moment conditions used in the estimation procedure. The null hypothesis is that 
there is no correlation between the residuals and the instrumental variables (Beck & Levine, 
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2004). The second hypothesis, i.e. no second-order serial correlation, is tested using Arellano–
Bond tests for first-order autocorrelation (AR1) and second-order autocorrelation (AR2).  Failure 
to reject the null hypothesises of both tests gives support to our model (Beck & Levine, 2004; 
Boyd et al., 2001). 
To sum up, dynamic panel techniques, such as GMM methods, fulfils the requirements of our 
proposed study since we have a relatively low number of years and a large number of cross-
sections per year, i.e. unbalanced panel. However, due to the structure of our dataset, overall 
superiority of the system GMM and for the consistency of our interpretations, we will use the 
system GMM for all models in the text. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion  
To get our results, we employ GMM for reasons explained earlier. We use the STATA software 
version 14.2 and Roodman’s (2009) xtabond2 command due to its more flexible features over 
the built-in command. Given the models, we treat all explanatory variables to be weakly 
exogenous. Furthermore, in all our models, we use the year dummies (2000-2015) to control for 
potential time shocks not captured in our specifications. Nevertheless, due to the lack of 
informative content of these variables and space constraints, we opt not to report them in our 
tables. 
4.1 Main Results 
4.1.1. Baseline Results 
Table 7 provides estimation results of equations (Eq. 1) using the two-step robust system GMM 
estimation methods. More specifically, this table presents the effect of bank market structure 
and market power, measured by concentration ratio of top 3 banks (CR3) and Lerner index 
(LI) respectively, on economic growth measured by the real per capita GDP (Gpc). While 
doing so, we use sets of banks–specific and country-specific variables discussed earlier.9 
Furthermore, throughout this study, we will use two proxies for financial development, namely 
private credit to GDP ratio (FIN_p) and liquid liabilities to GDP ratio (FIN_l). Hence, the results in 
each panel of Table 7 are organized as follows: (i) Models (1)–(3) and (7)–(9) are using FIN_p; 
and (ii) Models (4)–(6) and (10)–(12) are using FIN_l for CR3 and LI Models respectively. 
Note that Models (1), (4), (7), and (10) report results using only country-specific control 
variables. Models (2), (5), (8), and (11), on the other hand, provide estimation results using both 
banks- and country-specific control variables. Finally, under the Models (3), (6), (9) and (12) we 
consider the global financial crisis (C) and inflation (INF) to investigate their possible effects and 
significance on the economic growth. This format will be applied throughout all regression 
results tables where applicable.10 
                                                     
9    Initially, we started with all control variables, then, the insignificant ones are excluded gradually (one by one). These     
initial results using all control variables, however, are nor reported. 
10 After running regressions using several models applicable in our studies, it turns out that the financial crisis is 
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Diagnostic statistics, reported at the bottom of every table, imply adequacy of GMM 
estimations. More specifically, the autoregressive coefficients indicate significant persistence 
required for using GMM. Furthermore, the autocorrelation tests of the first–differenced residuals 
suggest the presence of autocorrelation of order 1 (AR1) in all cases but fail to reject the null of 
no autocorrelation of order 2 (AR2). These results indicate that the residuals in Eq. 1 are free 
from the autocorrelation problem in all models. Finally, we use the Hansen’s J test to test for the 
relevance and validity of the instruments used. Accordingly, the Hansen test statistics confirm 
the validity of instruments used in our estimation models. 
Table 7: Concentration – Growth Relationship: Linear Model − Baseline Results 
Variables Panel A - CR3 Panel B - LI 
FIN_p FIN_l FIN_p FIN_l 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
lnGpc t-1   0.984*** 0.939*** 0.946*** 0.978*** 0.931*** 0.942*** 1.036*** 1.113*** 1.063*** 1.098*** 0.868*** 0.893*** 
                          [0.009] [0.021] [0.011] [0.007] [0.023] [0.013] [0.024] [0.059] [0.065] [0.051] [0.133] [0.129] 
CR3                       -0.056*** -0.090** -0.086*** -0.065*** -0.094* -0.087** 
      
                          [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
      
LI 
      
-0.152** -0.093 -0.000 -0.337* 0.084 0.150 
                          
      
[0.070] [0.125] [0.022] [0.201] [0.202] [0.272] 
lnFIN_p -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 
   
-0.044** -0.064** -0.070*** 
   
                          [0.008] [0.012] [0.014] 
   
[0.022] [0.031] [0.023] 
   
lnFIN_l 
   
-0.001 -0.035* -0.033* 
   
-0.129* -0.021 -0.028 
                          
   
[0.009] [0.018] [0.018] 
   
[0.070] [0.055] [0.074] 
lnGCF 0.031** 0.027 0.040 0.030** 0.027 0.027 0.023* 0.063* 0.032** 0.034 0.032 0.028  
[0.012] [0.025] [0.026] [0.015] [0.027] [0.026] [0.013] [0.036] [0.016] [0.033] [0.081] [0.098] 
lnTO 0.029** 0.067** 0.052** 0.040*** 0.081** 0.069** -0.019 -0.018 -0.011 -0.021 0.109 0.104 
                          [0.013] [0.027] [0.024] [0.014] [0.033] [0.028] [0.020] [0.048] [0.021] [0.038] [0.115] [0.132] 
lnGS                        -0.025*** -0.022 -0.012 -0.025** -0.021 -0.001 0.006 -0.023 -0.049** -0.019 -0.029 -0.022 

























































































Constant 0.033 0.925** 0.683*** 0.043 1.177** 0.896*** -0.086 -1.957 -0.184 -0.134 2.010 1.434 
                          [0.036] [0.396] [0.252] [0.038] [0.492] [0.306] [0.062] [1.215] [0.506] [0.170] [2.229] [2.165] 
Observations              548 514 463 548 514 463 461 461 422 461 461 422 
No. of 
instruments        
34 35 37 34 35 37 10 21 22 18 15 17 
No. of groups             39 39 39 39 39 39 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Arellano-
Bond: AR (1)      
0.013 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.050 0.027 0.041 0.053 0.048 
Arellano-
Bond: AR (2)      
0.209 0.219 0.220 0.213 0.120 0.111 0.173 0.535 0.114 0.488 0.106 0.114 
Hansen test  
(p-val) 
0.247 0.566 0.826 0.288 0.683 0.906 0.108 0.788 0.177 0.357 0.613 0.829 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets, (ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
lnGpc is the natural log of the real GDP per capita. CR3 is the 3-bank concentration ratio (due to low values; we 
multiplied the coefficients by 100). LI is the Lerner index. lnFIN_p is the natural log of the ratio of private credit to GDP. 
lnFIN_l is the natural log of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. lnGCF is the natural log of the gross capital formation. 
lnTO is the natural log of trade openness. lnGS is the natural log of the government size. lnBNI is the natural log of the 
bank noninterest income to total income ratio. lnBCI is the natural log of the bank cost to income ratio. lnBNIM is the 
natural log of the bank net interest margin. lnINF is the natural log of inflation. C is the crisis dummy variable. 
Bank market structure, as measured by CR3 in Table 7, is found to be negatively significant in 
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variable, but only in two models, Model (7) and Model (10). Obviously, the results indicate a 
negative relationship between bank concentration and real per capita GDP (Gpc), regardless 
of whether we use market structure (CR3) or market power (LI) measure as proxies for bank 
concentration. For instance, Model (1) suggests that ceteris paribus, the impact of one 
standard deviation increase in bank concentration (CR3) decreases real per capita GDP by 
about 1.8%. Similarly, Model (10) suggests that ceteris paribus, the impact of one standard 
deviation increase in bank market power (LI) decreases real per capita GDP by about 4%. 
The findings support the competitive banking structure view and are consistent with the results 
found by Black & Strahan, (2002), Beck et al. (2003), Carlin & Mayer (2003), Deidda and Fattouh 
(2005), Cetorelli & Strahan (2006), Fernández et al. (2010), Ferreira (2012), Ghasemi & Abdolshah 
(2014), Abuzayed & Al–Fayoumi (2016) and Diallo and Koch (2017). The results, however, are in 
contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1995), Maudos & de Guevara (2006), and Abuzayed & Al–
Fayoumi (2016), among others, who found a positive relationship between bank concentration 
and economic growth. 
As for the control variables, the results are somehow mixed. By looking at the country-specific 
or macroeconomic control variables, trade openness (TO) shows a positively significant impact 
on Gpc in all models under Panel A, while gross capital formation (GCF) and government size 
(GS) are positively and negatively significant in Models (1) and (4), respectively. The findings 
are in line with existing literature that shows the negative impact of a large public sector on 
economic growth (Baklouti & Boujelbene, 2016; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2019; Sheehey, 1993). In 
other words, the impact of GS depends on the relative size of the public sector and the level 
of Gpc. Given the fact that the majority of OIC countries are overburdened with large public 
sectors that are, in most cases, ineffective and corrupt, finding a negative relationship is not a 
surprise. 
In Panel B, however, where LI is used as a proxy for bank concentration GCF is the only control 
variable positively significant in Models (7−9). For instance, an increase of 1% in GCF under 
Model (8) would increase Gpc by 0.06%. 
Similar results are found in the case of bank-specific control variables. Almost all variables are 
significant, indicating a negative impact on Gpc, at least when CR3 is used as a proxy for bank 
market structure (Panel A). Taking Model (2) as an illustration, the impact of 1% increase in bank 
noninterest income (BNI), bank cost to income ratio (BCI), and bank net interest margin (BNIM) 
would decrease Gpc by about 0.04%, 0.11% and 0.04%, respectively. In Panel B, however, only 
BNI is significant, with rather a positive impact on Gpc. In addition, the results indicate a positive 
effect of inflation (INF) on Gpc in all four Models, but the coefficients are significant in only three 
models, Models (3), (6), and (9). Contrary to that, crisis (C) is significant only in Model (9) 
indicating a negative impact on Gpc. 
Finally, since we are interested in financial development as well, it is worth noting that financial 
development proxies, FIN_p and FIN_l, have significant adverse effects on real per capita GDP 
(Gpc) in five cases. Although this might be counterintuitive, these results are in line with findings 
reported by Shen and Lee (2006), Bezemer, Grydaki, and Zhang (2014), Samargandi, Fidrmuc, 
and Ghosh (2015) and Benczúr, Karagiannis, and Kvedaras (2019). It seems that the 
composition of credit has changed over the years and the results are negative since most of 
the credit goes to financial assets, thus not contributing to the growth. Similarly, Naceur et al. 
(2017) found that thresholds mark the finance–growth relationship, and it depends on income 
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To sum up, these baseline results are preliminary as there might be some other conditions that 
might influence the bank concentration-economic growth relationship. This may include non-
linearity, income level, and corruption level to which we now turn.  
Table 8:  Concentration – Growth Relationship: Non–Linear Model 
Variables Panel A - CR3 Panel B - LI 
FIN_p FIN_l FIN_p FIN_l 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
lnGpc t-1   0.984*** 0.941*** 0.956*** 0.978*** 0.933*** 0.944*** 1.036*** 1.192*** 1.022*** 1.090*** 0.832*** 0.866*** 
                          [0.008] [0.021] [0.013] [0.007] [0.020] [0.013] [0.028] [0.104] [0.066] [0.046] [0.163] [0.104] 
CR3                       0.201* 0.063 0.023 0.196 0.045 -0.025 
      
                          [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] 
      
CR3SQR -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.000 
      
                          [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
      
LI             0.404* 1.051* 0.272 0.370 -0.236 -0.177 
                          
      
[0.209] [0.607] [0.285] [0.242] [0.529] [0.377] 
LISQR 
      
-0.816* -1.932* -0.478 -1.056* 0.556 0.457 
                          
      
[0.433] [1.049] [0.515] [0.573] [1.082] [0.808] 
lnFIN_p -0.002 -0.011 -0.003 
   
-0.039 -0.106* -0.018 
   
                          [0.007] [0.012] [0.011] 
   
[0.026] [0.058] [0.034] 
   
lnFIN_l 
   
-0.002 -0.035** -0.031* 
   
-0.121** -0.022 -0.010 
                          
   
[0.008] [0.017] [0.017] 
   
[0.059] [0.050] [0.038] 
lnGCF 0.029** 0.023 0.025 0.027** 0.024 0.027 0.018 0.034 0.025 -0.006 0.025 0.009 
  [0.012] [0.025] [0.021] [0.013] [0.027] [0.028] [0.016] [0.057] [0.019] [0.032] [0.072] [0.053] 
lnTO 0.031** 0.069** 0.044* 0.040*** 0.081** 0.068** -0.002 -0.028 -0.002 -0.013 0.139 0.099 
                          [0.013] [0.030] [0.023] [0.013] [0.032] [0.028] [0.023] [0.077] [0.029] [0.042] [0.132] [0.096] 
lnGS                         -0.030*** -0.023  -0.018  -0.029*** -0.023  -0.004  -0.016  0.029  -0.004  -0.016  -0.052  -0.041  



























































































Constant -0.030 0.843** 0.588*** -0.018 1.099*** 0.827*** -0.178 -2.889* -0.334 -0.116 2.741 2.231 
                          [0.041] [0.348] [0.214] [0.043] [0.397] [0.266] [0.146] [1.600] [0.926] [0.215] [2.784] [1.762] 
Observations              548 514 463 548 514 463 461 461 422 461 461 422 
No. of 
instruments        
35 36 38 35 36 38 21 19 21 15 15 16 
No. of groups             39 39 39 39 39 39 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Arellano-
Bond: AR(1)      
0.009 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.099 0.021 0.036 0.084 0.089 
Arellano-
Bond: AR(2)      
0.212 0.211 0.212 0.215 0.113 0.114 0.131 0.540 0.100 0.494 0.143 0.148 
Hansen test  
(p-val)    
0.294 0.529 0.730 0.327 0.686 0.891 0.101 0.464 0.102 0.120 0.371 0.429 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets, (ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
lnGpc is the natural log of the real GDP per capita.  CR3 is the 3-bank concentration ratio (due to low values; we 
multiplied the coefficients by 100). CR3SQR is the square term of CR3 (multiplied by 100). LI is the Lerner index. LISQR is 
the square term of LI. lnFIN_p is the natural log of the ratio of private credit to GDP. lnFIN_l is the natural log of the ratio 
of liquid liabilities to GDP. lnGCF is the natural log of the gross capital formation. lnTO is the natural log of trade 
openness. lnGS is the natural log of the government size. lnBNI is the natural log of the bank noninterest income to total 
income ratio. lnBCI is the natural log of the bank cost to income ratio. lnBNIM is the natural log of the bank net interest 
margin. lnINF is the natural log of inflation. C is the crisis dummy variable. 
  
4.1.2. Non–Linear Bank Market Structure & Economic Growth Relationships 
By investigating non–linearity of this relationship, we are simply testing whether the effect of 
bank concentration on economic growth depends on its degree/level. Looking from a bank’s 
perspective, experiencing some sort of bank power and/or concentration has its advantages 
and disadvantages as well. On one side, a bank may become more careful in credit analysis 
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with losses improves. On the other hand, as its market power increases, it may induce bank’s 
managers to take on riskier projects, thus increasing its probability of default and bad loans. 
Our baseline model presented in the previous section is modified by including a quadratic term 
of bank market structure, namely CR3SQR and LISQR, as explained in the Data and 
Methodology chapter. Table 8 represents various estimations of a non–linear model using CR3 
and LI as market structure measures, respectively.  
Diagnostic statistics imply the adequacy of GMM estimations and confirm the validity of 
instruments used in our estimation models. With the addition of quadratic terms, CR3SQR and 
LISQR, most linear coefficients of the bank market structure turn out to be insignificant. 
However, the results in this table show some evidence that there is a non-linear relationship 
between the bank market structure and economic growth. This is especially true for Model (1) 
using CR3 and Models (7–8) using LI. In these cases, the results indicate the existence of a 
threshold and that there is an “inverted U–shaped” relationship. These findings are similar to 
those reported by De Guevara and Maudos (2011). 
Taking into consideration Model (1), we find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between CR3 and Gpc. The cut-off point is 53.68, indicating that countries with CR3 below 
53.68 have a positive impact of CR3 on Gpc, while in countries with CR3 above 53.68 this 
impact is negative. In general, however, most countries (80% of the data) lie above this cut-off 
point, indicating that the bank concentration-economic growth relationship is significantly 
negative. Similarly, the results obtained for LI in Model (7) show that the cut-off point is 0.247. 
Countries with LI below this cut-off point are experiencing a positive impact of LI on Gpc, while 
those above it show evidence of a negative impact of LI on Gpc. It is found, however, that 
70% of data are above the cut-off point demonstrating a significant and negative relationship 
as well. 
Finally, financial development proxies indicate a negative impact on economic growth, but 
their significance is confirmed only in four cases. Similar results for control variables, including 
inflation, are found in Panel A, where CR3 is used, but this is not the case when LI is used in Panel 
B. 
All in all, we can conclude that at low levels of concentration, an increase in bank concertation 
increases growth. However, when a banking sector becomes more and more concentrated, 
the negative impact is coming in, and it reduces growth. Given that the concentration 
measures in many of the sample countries are above the threshold value, it means that the 
bank concentration is primarily decreasing economic growth within the sample. 
4.1.3. Income Levels, Bank Market Structure & Economic Growth Relationships 
The discussion so far focused on the general equations of the baseline and non–linear models, 
forcing the effect of bank concentration on economic growth to be identical even though a 
country might be classified as a developing or emerging economy. This is to say that 
estimations in Table 7 based on our original Eq. 1 and Table 8 based on our original Eq. 3 do 
not address whether this relationship depends on a country’s income level. As part of our 
research objectives, we want to investigate whether the effect of bank concentration on 
economic growth is significantly different for developing economies in this subsection and for 
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Table 9: Concentration – Growth Relationship – Developing Economies 
Variables 
Panel A - CR3 Panel B - LI 
FIN_p FIN_l FIN_p FIN_l 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnGpc t-1 0.921*** 0.858*** 0.876*** 0.884*** 0.952*** 0.812*** 1.067*** 1.034*** 
                          [0.017] [0.049] [0.038] [0.032] [0.025] [0.121] [0.152] [0.077] 
CR3                       0.003 0.327 -0.040 0.088       
                          [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]       
CR3SQR                      -0.002   -0.001       
                            [0.000]   [0.000]       
LI                                0.117 0.130 0.045 -0.270 
                                  [0.093] [0.122] [0.083] [0.542] 
LISQR                               -0.224  0.002 
                                    [0.159]  [0.630] 
DEV -0.077 -0.087 -0.101 -0.086 -0.077 -0.562 0.141 0.015 
                          [0.063] [0.101] [0.076] [0.090] [0.053] [0.454] [0.374] [0.123] 
CR3xDEV -0.001* -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***       
                          [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]       
LIxDEV         -0.069 0.005 -0.084 0.213 
                                  [0.093] [0.065] [0.126] [0.269] 
lnFIN_p                     0.021 0.040*     0.016 0.049   
                          [0.014] [0.024]     [0.019] [0.045]   
lnFIN_l                         -0.003 -0.010     -0.075 -0.046 
                              [0.023] [0.020]     [0.077] [0.046] 
lnGCF 0.003 0.014 0.017 0.024 0.022 -0.010 0.013 0.031 
 [0.016] [0.034] [0.030] [0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.017] [0.046] 
lnTO 0.017 0.014 0.047* 0.037 0.008 0.055*** 0.065** 0.041 
                          [0.012] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] [0.031] [0.040] 
lnGS                        -0.043** -0.074* -0.060** -0.067** -0.040* -0.042 0.025 -0.051 
                          [0.020] [0.040] [0.029] [0.026] [0.024] [0.048] [0.040] [0.059] 
Constant                  0.708*** 1.129** 1.085*** 1.025*** 0.373* 1.561 -0.694 -0.185 
                          [0.176] [0.476] [0.324] [0.334] [0.218] [1.155] [1.348] [0.610] 
β1 + β3 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.001 0.048 0.135 -0.038 -0.058 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.059] [0.086] [0.065] [0.388] 
Observations              548 548 548 548 461 461 461 461 
No. of instruments        36 19 16 20 34 19 13 17 
No. of groups             39 39 39 39 37 37 37 37 
Arellano-Bond: AR (1)      0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.034 0.020 0.019 
Arellano-Bond: AR (2)      0.228 0.245 0.239 0.234 0.030 0.112 0.110 0.146 
Hansen test (p-val)       0.357 0.209 0.238 0.228 0.236 0.070 0.323 0.624 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets, (ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
lnGpc is the natural log of the real GDP per capita. CR3 is the 3-bank concentration ratio (due to low values; we 
multiplied the coefficients by 100). CR3SQR is the square term of CR3 (multiplied by 100). LI is the Lerner index. LISQR 
is the square term of LI. DEV is the dummy variable representing a developing economy. CR3xDEV is the interaction 
term between CR3 and DEV. LIxDEV is the interaction term between LI and DEV. lnFIN_p is the natural log of the ratio 
of private credit to GDP. lnFIN_l is the natural log of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. lnGCF is the natural log of the 
gross capital formation. lnTO is the natural log of trade openness. lnGS is the natural log of the government size. 
In order to investigate this empirically, we introduce a dummy variable DEV that takes a value 
of 1 if a country is classified as a developing economy and 0 if it is classified as an emerging 
economy based on the World Bank classification11 Further, we interact this dummy variable 
                                                     
11  Note, that in case of interaction models, we are using only country-specific control variables. Furthermore, in case 
of non–linear models where we have CR3 and CR3SQR in Panel A and LI and LISQR in Panel B, we may interact 
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with each measure of bank market structure, namely CR3 and LI. Hence, we get CR3xDEV and 
LIxDEV as interaction terms as presented in Eq. 5 (baseline model) and Eq. 8 (non-linear model) 
in the previous subsection. This is done to allow the relationship between CR3 and Gpc and 
similarly, the relationship between LI and Gpc to be different for developing and emerging 
economies. Table 9 presents the results for both baseline and non–linear models. 
Diagnostic statistics imply adequacy of GMM estimations and confirm the validity of instruments 
used in our estimation models except for Model (5) where the autocorrelation tests of residuals 
suggest the presence of autocorrelation of order 2 (AR2), indicating the autocorrelation 
problem. 
Coefficients of the market structure and the market power are insignificant throughout. 
However, the interaction term between concentration and developing economies is 
negatively significant. In other words, the impact of the market structure and the market power 
are not significant for emerging economies, but they bring a negative impact on growth for 
developing economies. 
This has been pointed out by Brambor et al. (2006). He says that when it comes to interaction 
terms models, the coefficient CR3/LI only captures the effect of CR3/LI on Gpc when DEV is 
zero. Similarly, it should be evident that the coefficient on DEV only captures the effect of DEV 
on Gpc when CR3/LI is zero. Thus, the sign of the interaction term can be interpreted when the 
coefficients are jointly significant, even if the interaction term coefficient alone is found to be 
insignificant—in other words, testing whether CR3 + CR3xDEV = 0 is more crucial than looking 
at the significance/insignificance of the interaction term itself. 12 In particular, in emerging 
economies, the bank concentration has no impact on Gpc, while it has a negative impact on 
Gpc in developing economies, based on results in Table 9. In other words, this interaction model 
asserts that the effect of a change in CR3 on Gpc depends on the value of the conditioning 
variable DEV. Taking Model (3) as an example, given one standard deviation increase in CR3 
it would decrease Gpc by approximately 5.4% if a country belongs to the developing 
economies group, while it will have no impact if a country belongs to the emerging economies 
group.13 
4.1.4. Corruption, Bank Market Structure & Economic Growth Relationships  
Finally, as it was briefly mentioned in the previous subsection, we want to investigate whether 
the impact of the bank concentration on economic growth yields to same results for countries 
that are classified as corrupted or less–corrupted or it would yield to relatively similar results. The 
approach is like the previous model, except that we use control of corruption (COR) variable. 
Similarly, we interact with this COR variable with each measure of bank market structure, 
namely CR3 and LI. Hence, we get CR3xCOR and LIxCOR as interaction terms. 
                                                     
reported here), when we include interaction terms for both, linear and non–linear terms, the results show 
insignificance of all interaction terms and even insignificance of bank concentration terms. Hence, we conclude 
that it is better to interact only CR3 and LI as presented in Table 9. 
12  Testing joint significance of CR3 + CR3xDEV and/or LI + LIxDEV is presented in the table as 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽3 = 0. 
13  To explain this issue further and to be more precise, let us assume that CR3 coefficient in Model (3) is significant. In 
that case, the marginal effect for high-income countries is ∂Gpc /∂CR3 = 𝛽𝛽1 = -0.0003975, while the marginal effect 
for low-income countries is ∂Gpc /∂CR3 = 𝛽𝛽1+𝛽𝛽3 = -0.0003975 - 0.0023584 = -0.0027559 ≈ -0.003. This suggests that an 
increase in CR3 for one standard deviation would cause a negative change on Gpc by approximately 0.7% for 
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This is done to allow the relationship between CR3 and Gpc and similarly, the relationship 
between LI and Gpc to be different for corrupted and less–corrupted countries. Table 10 
presents the results for these relationships. 
Table 10: Concentration – Growth Relationship – Corrupted Countries 
Variables 
Panel A - CR3 Panel B - LI 
FIN_p FIN_l FIN_p FIN_l 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnGpc t-1 0.921*** 0.858*** 0.876*** 0.884*** 0.952*** 0.812*** 1.067*** 1.034*** 
                          [0.017] [0.049] [0.038] [0.032] [0.025] [0.121] [0.152] [0.077] 
CR3                       0.003 0.327 -0.040 0.088       
                          [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003]       
CR3SQR                      -0.002   -0.001       
                            [0.000]   [0.000]       
LI                                0.117 0.130 0.045 -0.270 
                                  [0.093] [0.122] [0.083] [0.542] 
LISQR                               -0.224  0.002 
                                    [0.159]  [0.630] 
DEV -0.077 -0.087 -0.101 -0.086 -0.077 -0.562 0.141 0.015 
                          [0.063] [0.101] [0.076] [0.090] [0.053] [0.454] [0.374] [0.123] 
CR3xDEV -0.001* -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***       
                          [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]       
LIxDEV         -0.069 0.005 -0.084 0.213 
                                  [0.093] [0.065] [0.126] [0.269] 
lnFIN_p                     0.021 0.040*     0.016 0.049   
                          [0.014] [0.024]     [0.019] [0.045]   
lnFIN_l                         -0.003 -0.010     -0.075 -0.046 
                              [0.023] [0.020]     [0.077] [0.046] 
lnGCF 0.003 0.014 0.017 0.024 0.022 -0.010 0.013 0.031 
 [0.016] [0.034] [0.030] [0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.017] [0.046] 
lnTO 0.017 0.014 0.047* 0.037 0.008 0.055*** 0.065** 0.041 
                          [0.012] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] [0.031] [0.040] 
lnGS                        -0.043** -0.074* -0.060** -0.067** -0.040* -0.042 0.025 -0.051 
                          [0.020] [0.040] [0.029] [0.026] [0.024] [0.048] [0.040] [0.059] 
Constant                  0.708*** 1.129** 1.085*** 1.025*** 0.373* 1.561 -0.694 -0.185 
                          [0.176] [0.476] [0.324] [0.334] [0.218] [1.155] [1.348] [0.610] 
β1 + β3 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.001 0.048 0.135 -0.038 -0.058 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.059] [0.086] [0.065] [0.388] 
Observations              548 548 548 548 461 461 461 461 
No. of instruments        36 19 16 20 34 19 13 17 
No. of groups             39 39 39 39 37 37 37 37 
Arellano-Bond: AR(1)      0.007 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.034 0.020 0.019 
Arellano-Bond: AR(2)      0.228 0.245 0.239 0.234 0.030 0.112 0.110 0.146 
Hansen test (p-val)       0.357 0.209 0.238 0.228 0.236 0.070 0.323 0.624 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets, (ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
lnGpc is the natural log of the real GDP per capita. CR3 is the 3-bank concentration ratio (due to low values; we 
multiplied the coefficients by 100). CR3SQR is the square term of CR3 (multiplied by 100). LI is the Lerner index. LISQR 
is the square term of LI. DEV is the dummy variable representing a developing economy. CR3xDEV is the interaction 
term between CR3 and DEV. LIxDEV is the interaction term between LI and DEV. lnFIN_p is the natural log of the ratio 
of private credit to GDP. lnFIN_l is the natural log of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. lnGCF is the natural log of the 
gross capital formation. lnTO is the natural log of trade openness. lnGS is the natural log of the government size. 
Based on the results presented in Table 10, diagnostic statistics imply the adequacy of GMM 
estimations and confirm the validity of instruments used in our estimation models. Most baseline 
and non-linear coefficients of CR3 and LI are significant. However, corruption (COR) 
coefficients and their interaction with bank market structure measures (CR3xCOR & LIxCOR) 
coefficients are all individually insignificant. Nevertheless, the joint significance tests confirm the 
validity of interaction terms introduction in non-linear Models (2), (4) and (6) in which the 
interaction terms are insignificant on their own. Thus, in these cases, we can interpret signs of 
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For illustration purposes, we will take a few examples. Given that in Model (2) 𝛽𝛽1+𝛽𝛽3 = 0.003, we 
will multiply this number with the lowest, the mean, and the highest corruption value in our 
dataset. Hence, the lowest control for corruption value was recorded in Afghanistan in 2008, 
and it was -1.64 indicating the highest degree of corruption. When multiplied by 0.003 we get 
-0.00492, indicating a decrease in Gpc by about 0.5%. Next, the mean corruption value for our 
sample is -0.60, and after multiplying it with 0.003, we get -0.0018, showing that on average 
Gpc would decrease by 0.2%. Finally, the highest value for the control of corruption, i.e. the 
least corrupted country was Pakistan in 2009, and it was 1.57. In this case, we see that there will 
be an increase in Gpc by 0.5%. 
Overall, the table confirms the significance of the market structure measure of the bank 
concentration and non–linearity of its relationship with economic growth. Also, joint 
significance tests suggest that the effect of CR3 and LI on Gpc depends on the level of 
corruption in these three models. 
 
4.2. Robustness Checks 
This section highlights the main results of robustness tests following the same format that we had 
in the previous subsections. Here, however, we would like to make a few notes. First, in this 
section, we will report results using three additional measures of the bank concentration. Two 
of them are the market structure measures − the concentration ratio of the top 5 banks (CR5) 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) − and the third one is the market power measure − 
the Boone indicator (BI) – as discussed earlier. Second, we will report data using only private 
credit to GDP ratio (FIN_p) as a proxy for financial development.  
4.2.1 Baseline and Non-Linear Models  
The baseline and non-linear models for economic growth and bank concentration 
relationships are presented in Table 11. We will start first with baseline (linear) models (Models 
1-2 and 5-6 for CR5 and BI respectively). The diagnostic tests confirm the validity of the 
instruments used and the adequacy of GMM estimation. The results show that the coefficients 
for the market structure measure (CR5), although negative, are all insignificant. In contrast, the 
market power measure (BI) coefficients are negative but significant only in the Model (5). It 
seems that the impact of the bank market structure on economic growth is not significant, 
although we found significance between CR3 and Gpc in Table 7. The results, however, show 
some evidence of the bank market power (BI) impact on economic growth, similar to the 
findings of Table 7. Interestingly, the impact of financial development is positive, but 
insignificant in all models. Finally, when it comes to the control variables, the results conform to 
the findings in Table 7 when it comes to their significance and signs. 
When it comes to non-linear models (Models 3-4 and 7-8 for CR5 and BI respectively), we found 
some evidence earlier about non-linear, the inverted U–shaped, the relationship between 
bank concentration measures on one side and economic growth on the other (see Table 8). 
However, using our robustness models, the only non-linear relationship is found in the Model (8) 
of Table 11 where coefficients for BI and its square term (BISQR) are both significant and 
positive, contrary to the earlier findings. Based on these results, it seems that an increase in BI 
increases Gpc, and after it reaches the inflection point (-0.044), it intensifies its positive impact 
on Gpc significantly. When it comes to financial development proxy and other control 
variables, then robustness tests indicate similar findings as in the case of linear models reported 
earlier. 
4.2.2 Income and Corruption Level Models 
Table 12 reports robustness tests for developing economies (Models 1-2 for CR5 and 5-6 for BI) 
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developing countries’ models, the results show a positive and significant impact of CR5 only. 
At the same time, all other linear and non-linear terms for bank market structure/power 
measures are insignificant. In line with the main results, the interaction terms are significant in 
Models (1) and (2), but the joint significance test is confirmed only in Model (1). Hence, as with 
the main results, we find limited evidence that the impact of bank market structure on 
economic growth differs statistically with a country’s income level. In other words, we find some 
evidence that bank concentration hurts economic growth only in low-income countries. 
Finally, the results in Table 12 show no evidence of financial development impact on economic 
growth whatsoever. The same applies to the majority of control variables except for GS that 
exhibits a negative impact on Gpc – the results that are in line with our main findings. 
Table 11: Robustness Checks for Linear and Non-Linear Models  
Variables 
CR5 BI 
Linear Non-Linear Linear Non-Linear 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnGpct-1 0.960*** 0.919*** 0.962*** 0.885*** 0.988*** 0.928*** 0.987*** 0.922*** 
                          [0.012] [0.027] [0.012] [0.046] [0.010] [0.015] [0.010] [0.014] 
CR5                       -0.022 -0.112 -0.003 -0.004     
                          [0.000] [0.001] [0.004] [0.008]     
CR5SQR                      0.002 0.002     
                            [0.000] [0.000]     
BI                            -0.123* -0.072 -0.065 0.572* 
                              [0.065] [0.156] [0.145] [0.331] 
BISQR                           0.549 6.426** 
                                [1.022] [2.888] 
lnFIN_p 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.013 
                          [0.009] [0.018] [0.010] [0.028] [0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.016] 
lnGCF 0.023 0.030 0.021 0.019 0.036*** 0.047* 0.036*** 0.046 
 [0.016] [0.034] [0.013] [0.046] [0.013] [0.028] [0.013] [0.030] 
lnTO 0.061*** 0.082*** 0.060*** 0.119* 0.017 0.048* 0.017 0.050* 
                          [0.020] [0.030] [0.018] [0.061] [0.010] [0.028] [0.011] [0.027] 
lnGS                        -0.031 -0.016 -0.023 -0.008 -0.025** -0.034 -0.023** -0.026 
                          [0.027] [0.032] [0.019] [0.055] [0.012] [0.025] [0.011] [0.031] 
lnBNI  -0.043**  -0.058  -0.041  -0.050* 
  [0.021]  [0.043]  [0.025]  [0.027] 
lnBCI  -0.104**  -0.138*  -0.130***  -0.147*** 
                           [0.049]  [0.073]  [0.038]  [0.037] 
lnBNIM  -0.047**  -0.069*  -0.046***  -0.053*** 
                           [0.022]  [0.040]  [0.016]  [0.018] 
lnINF  0.009*  0.015*  0.010***  0.009*** 
                           [0.005]  [0.008]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
C  -0.012  -0.007  -0.008  -0.008 
                           [0.008]  [0.011]  [0.007]  [0.008] 
Constant                  0.064 0.974** 0.167 1.411* -0.018 0.995*** -0.018 1.116*** 
                          [0.094] [0.403] [0.153] [0.756] [0.050] [0.319] [0.044] [0.321] 
Observations              472 400 472 400 521 467 521 467 
No. of instruments        34 20 35 20 32 37 33 38 
No. of groups             36 36 36 36 39 39 39 39 
Arellano-Bond: AR(1)      0.009 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Arellano-Bond: AR(2)      0.318 0.345 0.280 0.258 0.197 0.153 0.194 0.126 
Hansen test (p-val)       0.514 0.705 0.531 0.732 0.220 0.641 0.286 0.770 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets, (ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
lnGpc is the natural log of the real GDP per capita. σ is the income volatility. CR5 is the 5-bank concentration ratio. 
CR5SQR is the square term of CR5 (multiplied by 100).  BI is the Boone indicator. BISQR is the square term of BI.  lnFIN_p 
is the natural log of the ratio of private credit to GDP. lnFIN_l is the natural log of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. 
lnGCF is the natural log of the gross capital formation. lnTO is the natural log of trade openness. lnGS is the natural 
log of the government size. lnBNI is the natural log of the bank noninterest income to total income ratio. lnBCI is the 
natural log of the bank cost to income ratio. lnBNIM is the natural log of the bank net interest margin. lnINF is the 
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Table 12: Robustness Checks for Developing Economies & Corruption Level Models 
Variables 
CR5 BI 
Developing Corruption Developing Corruption 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lnGpct-1 0.884*** 0.899*** 0.952*** 0.952*** 0.919*** 0.923*** 0.863*** 0.877*** 
                          [0.036] [0.041] [0.019] [0.018] [0.020] [0.024] [0.111] [0.061] 
CR5                       0.002** -0.005 -0.027 -0.345     
                          [0.001] [0.008] [0.000] [0.004]     
CR5SQR                     0.004  0.002     
                           [0.000]  [0.000]     
BI                            0.220 0.360 0.048 0.064 
                              [0.199] [0.238] [0.419] [0.510] 
BISQR                          1.554  -0.095 
                               [2.329]  [3.794] 
DEV 0.121 0.089   -0.191*** -0.184***   
                          [0.102] [0.103]   [0.053] [0.060]   
CR5xDEV        -0.004*** -0.003**       
                          [0.001] [0.002]       
BIxDEV             -0.408 -0.362   
                              [0.311] [0.311]   
COR   0.037 0.032   0.092 0.083 
                            [0.048] [0.045]   [0.075] [0.053] 
CR5xCOR     -0.015 -0.008     
                            [0.001] [0.001]     
BIxCOR                  -0.073 0.027 
                                [0.491] [0.340] 
lnFIN_p 0.035 0.021 0.015 0.014 0.026 0.028 0.053 0.057* 
                          [0.024] [0.030] [0.011] [0.011] [0.016] [0.020] [0.058] [0.033] 
lnGCF 0.035 0.034 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.026 0.105 0.050 
 [0.030] [0.041] [0.020] [0.020] [0.027] [0.031] [0.095] [0.070] 
lnTO 0.011 0.015 0.075** 0.074** 0.005 -0.003 0.167 0.148 
                          [0.020] [0.029] [0.032] [0.029] [0.019] [0.021] [0.130] [0.096] 
lnGS                        -0.102** -0.100** -0.033 -0.034 -0.065* -0.059* -0.097 -0.081 
                          [0.045] [0.046] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033] [0.069] [0.061] 
Constant                  0.882*** 1.068** 0.100 0.220 0.765*** 0.730*** 0.196 0.286 
                          [0.331] [0.482] [0.107] [0.182] [0.241] [0.253] [0.344] [0.325] 
β1 + β3 -0.002** -0.008 -0.000 -0.004 -0.188 -0.002 -0.024 0.091 
  [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.004] [0.200] [0.321] [0.739] [0.657] 
Observations              472 472 444 444 521 521 486 486 
No. of instruments        20 19 35 36 34 35 14 13 
No. of groups             36 36 36 36 39 39 39 39 
Arellano-Bond: AR(1)      0.012 0.015 0.013 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.039 0.011 
Arellano-Bond: AR(2)      0.579 0.464 0.188 0.164 0.203 0.203 0.108 0.115 
Hansen test (p-val)       0.312 0.239 0.491 0.499 0.361 0.284 0.270 0.409 
Notes: (i) Standard errors in brackets, (ii) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
lnGpc is the natural log of the real GDP per capita. σ is the income volatility. CR5 is the 5-bank concentration ratio 
(multiplied by 100). CR5SQR is the square term of CR5 (multiplied by 100). BI is the Boone indicator. BISQR is the 
square term of BI. DEV is the dummy variable representing developing economies. CR3xDEEV is the interaction term 
between CR3 and DEV. BIxDEV is the interaction term between BI and DEV. COR is a variable representing a 
corrupted country. CR5xCOR is the interaction term between CR5 and COR (multiplied by 100). BIxCOR is the 
interaction term between BI and COR. lnFIN_p is the natural log of the ratio of private credit to GDP. lnFIN_l is the 
natural log of the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. lnGCF is the natural log of the gross capital formation. lnTO is the 
natural log of trade openness. lnGS is the natural log of the government size.  
After low-income countries analysis, we come to the robustness checks and analysis of 
corrupted–countries model's whereby Models 3-4 and 7-8 of Table 12 report findings for these 
models using CR5 and BI, respectively. All models are correctly specified as can be seen from 
diagnostic statistics tests. Results indicate no significance whatsoever for most of the 
coefficients. All bank market structure/power coefficients, both linear and non–linear terms, 
are insignificant. This is contrary to the findings previously reported in Table 10, where both linear 
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terms coefficients are also insignificant. This is further validated by the insignificance of joint 
significance tests of all models. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The present study was designed to determine the effect of bank concentration on economic 
growth in OIC countries. These findings suggest that in general bank concentration has a mostly 
negative impact on economic growth. Furthermore, the results show a positive impact of bank 
concentration on growth at a low level of concentration. However, this positive impact has its 
limits and becomes negative for the majority of OIC countries due to the high level of bank 
concentration. Although counterintuitive, the impact of financial development on economic 
growth is found to be negative using our main independent variables. It was also shown that 
the impact of bank concentration on economic growth depends on the country’s income 
level. 
Nevertheless, it seems that this relationship is not affected by the country’s corruption level. 
Finally, our robustness tests show little support for our findings. In the case of financial 
development, the robustness tests indicate the opposite, i.e. the positive impact on economic 
growth. 
These findings provide practical implications for all stakeholders. First, the negative impact of 
bank concentration on economic growth can be decreased by increasing competition in the 
market. One way would be to open up the market for new entrants in the banking sector. 
Second, the relationship is non-linear, and the negative impact of the bank market power is 
dominating. Therefore, the policymakers and regulators need to keep the bank market power 
levels as low as possible and improve other aspects of socio-economic life. Third, improving 
overall socio-economic conditions, combined with specific controls of bank concentration, are 
among the steps that should be taken by policymakers and regulators of developing- and 
emerging economies within OIC countries. Fourth, it seems that improving overall financial 
development may be an ineffective policy for improving the economic conditions of OIC 
countries. Instead, the policymakers should focus directly on curbing bank concentration if 
they want to achieve better economic growth rates. Fifth, using a single measure could be 
very misleading, and hence it is up to regulators to consider as many measures as possible. 
Central banks and other regulators should observe bank-level and market-level data regularly 
to be able to take precautionary measures toward banks that are gaining higher market 
power. This could bring about more growth and overall stability to the economies of OIC 
countries. In short, there is a need for a case–by–case approach by regulators and 
policymakers as one–size–fits–all may not be the best solution in this scenario. 
This study, as is the case with any other studies, comes with several limitations. At the same time, 
these limitations are also potential areas for further research on the topic and additional 
investigations. First, we used the real per capita GDP as a proxy for economic growth. It would 
be worthwhile investigating whether the data will reveal the same results if alternative proxies 
are used. For example, we could use annual growth rates of GDP instead of GDP per capita. 
Alternatively, we could also use the growth rates of various industry sectors and bank-level data 
instead of aggregates. Second, although we included a few bank-specific and country-
specific control variables, alternative proxies could produce better and/or more reliable results 
on the topic. For example, collecting data on the interest rate that largely were not available 
for our sample, or alternative measures of bank efficiency and profitability can bring about 
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